Hello Henry

I'm not sure if you saw my note on the other thread. They've closed it now.

Here is what I wrote there, in my post at the end:

******************

Henry

You are correct - I did miss something important about your views. My apologies.

I only skimmed over your earlier essay, "Mental Causation, Freewill, and the Soul"; and if I ever noticed as I was skimming the extent to which you committed to dualism there, it slipped my mind later as I tried to focus on the objections in your responses on my threads, and dealt with some other non-board issues. Without your commitment to dualism in mind, I assumed you were coming from a much different place in some of your comments on my threads.

Embarrassed by this mistake, I just re-read your earlier essay with far more attention. It has raised a few questions for me, which I hope you will discuss with me.

Go ahead. I will respond as time permits. I, of course, encourage others to carefully read, or reread, "Mental Causation, Freewill, and the Soul" and participate in substantive discussion. It may be helpful to summarize the position stated:

1. Freewill is an important assumption in our everyday lives, regardless of our metaphysical views about ultimate reality, including common materialist views that cavalierly deny freewill.

2. Mental causation (i.e. that the mind can cause physical events, particularly in the brain) has been conclusively shown through brain imaging techniques.

3. Mental causation entails, or strongly suggests, freewill.

4. Mental causation and freewill taken together strongly, if not necessarily, point to dualism and the existence of some sort of entity, call it the "soul," that establishes personal identity, and establishes the "free" autonomous agent.

5. The existence of a "soul" is, of course, highly relevant to our post-Mormon worldview.

So far, no one challenged the substance of the original post, which surprised me given the scope of intellectual talent on the Board, and the wide variety of academic backgrounds. Perhaps it was too long and tedious for some to get into. But, as one responder noted, it was "amazingly clear" whether one accepts the conclusions or not.

Anyway, perhaps you can jumpstart a more substantive discussion.

HB

Henry Bemis Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> 2. Mental causation (i.e. that the mind can cause
> physical events, particularly in the brain) has
> been conclusively shown through brain imaging
> techniques.
>
> 3. Mental causation entails, or strongly
> suggests, freewill.

If I believe in a mind is that your "mental causation"? This is the crux of your argument - that the brain isn't all that is there?

Whatever I believe is going to be like bradley's "Drawing Hands." It is so speculative and you have pointed out in your number two "conclusively" what you believe. I can respect that without further discussion because it seems to me to be not an enjoyable speculation on my part with your part because I have not conclusively decided to believe.

So, I would rather discuss here more often how Janice Kapp Perry's song "In The Hollow of Thy Hand" is more like "Drawing Hands" in Mormons giving themselves mental strokes from their corporeal father in heaven. At least I know where their mind is at and how their delusions drive me out of mine.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 03/19/2015 06:32PM by Elder Berry.

I was not convinced by the evidence you provided that mental causation had been proven using brain imagaging techniques. I didn't see why one would have to postulate mental causes to explain the experimental data. If Henry Bemis can explain why mental causes are required to explain the data, that would help.

BUT I doubt he can.

In addition, it seems that Henry fails to appreciate the radical nature of the claim that there are mental causes. If there are mental causes, then it follows that somewhere in the brain, or body, there are electrons, molecules, atoms, or other material particles or substances that fail to follow the same physical laws that those entities follow outside the brain, or body. THAT is a radical conclusion. It is as if Henry were saying that while a ball will fall when dropped outside the brain, inside the brain the dropped ball will zoom upward or around in a curved path.

In addition, Henry fails to be convincing regarding free will. The sense of free will fails to show its existence. If it did, there would be no long-standing debate over its existence. In addition, its difficult to say whether free-will exists or not when its not even clear what free-will is supposed to be.

"I was not convinced by the evidence you provided that mental causation had been proven using brain imagaging techniques. I didn't see why one would have to postulate mental causes to explain the experimental data. If Henry Bemis can explain why mental causes are required to explain the data, that would help."

"BUT I doubt he can."

COMMENT: Well, of course, I did not cite to any data directly. You would have to consider the studies referenced in the cited material for details. However, in broad terms, it would appear that if a pathological neural state can be specifically identified, such that aberrant behavior is tied to that neural state; and then it can be shown that after mental effort specifically directed to that behavior the neural state changed, and the behavior disappeared, that would, I argue, suggest mental causation--unless one has already determined that mental causation is not possible.

If you think it doesn't, it would appear that the onus would be on you to provide a purely physical explanation. And one that was quite specific. But, to quote you, I doubt you can!

_________________________________________________________

"In addition, it seems that Henry fails to appreciate the radical nature of the claim that there are mental causes. If there are mental causes, then it follows that somewhere in the brain, or body, there are electrons, molecules, atoms, or other material particles or substances that fail to follow the same physical laws that those entities follow outside the brain, or body. THAT is a radical conclusion. It is as if Henry were saying that while a ball will fall when dropped outside the brain, inside the brain the dropped ball will zoom upward or around in a curved path."

COMMENT: Well, first I most certainly do appreciate the radical nature of the claim, particularly in the context of a materialist worldview. But, I am presenting well-known and confirmed data, regardless of how radical it might be. Moreover, I would respond that "physical laws" and physical theories must expand their theoretical reach to encompass new data, including mental causation. This is how science works.

Moreover, atoms, molecules, etc. according to modern science are governed fundamentally by quantum laws of physics which make the classical laws you cling to out of date. Your reference to gravity, and specified deterministic paths, is particularly inappropriate in this context. For a discussion of possible quantum brain effects, and the rejection of traditional materialist science in the context of consciousness and mental causation, see Henry Stapp, The Mindful Universe. A host of other scientists also address this issue.

________________________________________________________

"In addition, Henry fails to be convincing regarding free will. The sense of free will fails to show its existence. If it did, there would be no long-standing debate over its existence."

COMMENT: Did I rely upon the "sense of freewill?" NO! I relied upon experimental data. I have read most of the arguments against freewill, including the seminal neuro-psychology based book by Daniel Wegner, called The Illusion of Conscious Will. Wegner's book, written in 2002, relies exclusively on undermining the sense of freewill, while completely ignoring the extensive data supporting mental causation; even though much of it was well known at the time, including Jeffrey Schwartz' work.

Are you saying that if the existence of something is subject to "long-standing debate" that alone counts as evidence against it? You can't be serious.

___________________________________________________

"In addition, its difficult to say whether free-will exists or not when its not even clear what free-will is supposed to be".

COMMENT: I defined freewill in my post, and it really is not that difficult to define: Freewill exists if there is an autonomous agent, such that said agent can make choices between alternative actions, and the acts of such agent have causal efficacy. Why is that concept so difficult?

Finally, I appreciate your push-back, but you should at least read the literature before you decide mental causation or freewill is impossible.

Alfred R. Mele is excellent on the weakness of the scientific case against free will.

http://m.chronicle.com/article/Alfred-R-Mele-The-Case/131166/

He expands on this in his recent, and very excellent book, Free: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free Will:

http://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/0199371628/ref=mp_s_a_1_1?qid=1426869707&sr=8-1&keywords=mele+free&pi=AC_SY200_QL40&dpPl=1&dpID=4122DpZJxYL&ref=plSrch

(And by the way, we shouldn't discount our "sense" of Free Will so cavalierly. Our sense of self is the central fact in our lives. If that is merely an illusion then everything else the brain does, if we insist on materialism, is also an illusion.)

Human

It's not that the sense of free-will is an illusion. We do have that sense, at least most of us. (Assuming, that is, that the term "free-will" can be given definite meaning, which I doubt.) The problem is that such a sense provides no evidence for the existence of free-will. Such a sense seems to be compatible with the absense of free-will, as well as with the presence of free-will. But, again, it's difficult to have this debate without a good definition of free-will. The only people who seem able to provide a clear definition are the soft-determinists, and, usually, those who demand the existence of free-will don't like soft-determinist definitions.

I guess my major point is that insistence on the existence of a feature like free-will that cannot even be defined in a way that satisfies most thinkers seems like a poor way to demonstrate the existence of some other thing, such as mind or mental causes.

PhELPs Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> It's not that the sense of free-will is an
> illusion. We do have that sense, at least most of
> us. (Assuming, that is, that the term "free-will"
> can be given definite meaning, which I doubt.) The
> problem is that such a sense provides no evidence
> for the existence of free-will.

If we are to assume that our senses relay to us accurate ideas about that which we sense, this table this keyboard this screen this BB and this room with a view of a road a pasture a farm and, ultimately, the Rocky Mountains, if my sense of these things indicate the existence of these things, then why the double standard with our sense of self, inextricably tied to our sense of free will?

Of course our senses sometimes deceive us, yes. A stick doesn’t actually bend in the water. But that is a secondary effect, literally an illusion. We do not question the existence of the water the stick and the sunlight glistening along the water’s banks, though. Should we?

Where do we begin our assuming? But more to the point, *what is it that does the assuming*?

If you worry that we assume too much, then begin with the assumptions we base upon our sense of our ideas, ideas that are extensions from our sense of things ‘out there’. Are our ideas of numbers and their relations with one another illusions (figuratively), or do they exist? If they exist, how, where? And if they exist, are the ideas that we create from them, which we perceive in our minds, that we assume corresponds with the world of things ‘out there’, ideas like “scientific laws”, illusions? Or do they reliably indicate that which exists 'out there'?

I find it so very odd that some are willing to say “scientific laws” are real but question the existence of that which perceives those “scientific laws”. For example, this is very odd to me:

> Such a sense [of free-will] seems
> to be compatible with the absense of free-will, as
> well as with the presence of free-will.

I cannot understand how a sense of free will is compatible with the absence of free-will.

Our sense of self is one and the same with our sense of free-will (for all but the tiniest fraction of us). We can question all the things we freely perceive, from the mountains to the "scientific laws" which underlay them, to the mathematics & logic that underlays it all, but questioning that which does the perceiving & questioning is to undo everything else.

Human

Something good on the definitions of free-will:

http://www.summer12.isc.uqam.ca/page/docs/readings/Mele-Alfred/Mele.pdf

Allow me to add, definitions are literally "for the sake of discussion". Things themselves are separate from the names we give them.

Hi Human. Thanks for this contribution.

In the cited article, Mele states that freewill does not require non-physical minds or souls, and takes the negative tact of putting the onus on the materialist to prove that freewill doesn't exist. I disagree with this approach.

First, you cannot have freewill without a conscious autonomous agent. So, an adherent of freewill must be able to at least address where such an agent comes from, not to mention the mental properties that such an agent must have. I see no way of answering this question without dualism of some sort, even if the mind turns out to be some sort of expanded understanding of the "physical."

Second, in my view the extensive correlations between the brain and mind, and the lack of any sort of ontological explanation of mind and freewill, supports the naysayers. Our intuitions of freewill, although as you say not to be minimized, are not, of themselves, sufficient to support freewill scientifically. Our intuitions can be wrong. But hard data that is beyond such intuitions cannot be ignored.

"(And by the way, we shouldn't discount our "sense" of Free Will so cavalierly. Our sense of self is the central fact in our lives. If that is merely an illusion then everything else the brain does, if we insist on materialism, is also an illusion.)"

COMMENT: Yes. And I pointed that out quite clearly in my essay.

On a personal note, I recently saw your reference to your participation in the L.A. Marathon. I was disappointed that you didn't contact me while in SoCal; particularly if you made your way down to SD. I would have loved to meet you personally, and talked over lunch, or whatever. Maybe next time.

RS

I must have mis-wrote, which isn't unusual. --I *watched* the L.A. Marathon on an iPad.

I have in me one or two big runs per year, maybe only one these days, and the Fall in Vancouver or Montreal will likely be next. L.A. is a big, bucket list run that I hope to do someday, though.

But I'm gladdened by your invitation. If I'm in SoCal I'll let you know. And the same most definitely goes for you. Let me know if by some chance you're up here on the Tundra.




I agree with you a lot in these discussions, obviously, and learn a lot, too. But on one point we profoundly disagree.

First, to get it out of the way, I think the "conscious autonomous agent" and "free will" are near to or exactly the same thing. Show me a "conscious autonomous agent" who denies having free-will in a practical sense. You have to comb the annals of psychiatry to find these rare beings. The self senses itself to be free and autonomous, even when imprisoned and lacking all choices. (See The Diving Bell And The Butterfly for an illustration.)

But where we profoundly disagree is on this point of what it is we shall assume.

All assumptions are made by *that which does the assuming*, which is itself not an assumption. It is. Science, all of it, to one degree or another is an assumption, in that it must like everything else begin with things taken a priori. The ultimate a priori is the self making the first assumption.

So to your point: no matter how extensive the correlations between the brain and the mind extend, we need never have "any sort of ontological explanation of mind and freewill" to say that mind and freewill exist. The Self stands before *any* explanation of anything, including mind, free will and even itself. The Self stands prior to *any* extensive correlations between anything, including correlations observed between the brain and the mind. If anything *is* the Self is. If it is not, then nothing else is either.

Science can say nothing without a self saying it. So yes, science can say there is no self and there is no free-will, but a self said that freely enough.


Look, I've made it known over the years that I don't think the good Bishop Berkeley has ever been refuted (which is not the same thing as saying that Dr. Johnson's foot didn't hurt when he kicked a stone, as witty a rejoiner as that may have been). This from the beginning of A Treatise Concerning The Principles Of Human Understanding:

"But besides all that endless variety of Ideas or Objects of Knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers Operations, as Willing, Imagining, Remembering, etc. about them. This perceiving, active Being is what I call Mind, Spirit, Soul or my Self. By which Words I do not denote any one of my Ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they Exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are Perceiv'd, for the Existence of an Idea consists in being Perceiv'd."

In other words, the Self precedes even ideas about itself. The Big Bang, if that is an idea science still believes, does not precede the Self that perceives it.

So, if Science wants to say there is no mind there is no self there is no free-will there is no soul then it will have to do a hell of lot more than say "Libet etc". Right? In other words, to refute something so a priori fundamental as my Self will require a hell of lot more than the fumblings over the nascent ability to map correlations between my behaviours and the position of my brain's neurons etc at any specific moment. No?

Science is very far away from anything concrete in any of this, very very far away. And as I've said elsewhere, science should stop pretending it is learning anything about "mind" & "consciousness" & "self" & "free-will" and simply go about pursuing *brain studies*. There is still plenty to learn about the brain itself as a thing before it makes any leaps into what are non-existing existing things like "self" etc. --"non-existing existing things" is my clumsy way of indicating the nature of mind etc., but I'm all for the possibility of an "expanded understanding of the physical", as quasi-mormon as that could turn out to be ;^/

Okay, I'm rambling and not thinking, as usual. I'm grateful that you countenance my laziness.

Human

(This discussion last week had me go back to the beginning of my fascination into this stuff. I realized just how absolutely bull-shitty this was from Antonio R. Damasio at the beginning of the century:

https://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/damsio.pdf

Nothing has changed since that article: the head-line claims about brain/mind are still wildly disconnected from the actual science (which has progressed enormously, of course).

Also, your seeming dismissal of Penrose and Hameroff elsewhere has me re-looking at The Emperor's New Mind.

Okay, enough.

(Bottom line, Henry, the onus is on those who deny the existence of the self/free-will, not on us who live with it everyday.)

HUMAN: First, to get it out of the way, I think the "conscious autonomous agent" and "free will" are near to or exactly the same thing. Show me a "conscious autonomous agent" who denies having free-will in a practical sense. You have to comb the annals of psychiatry to find these rare beings. The self senses itself to be free and autonomous, even when imprisoned and lacking all choices. (See The Diving Bell And The Butterfly for an illustration.)

COMMENT: I agree. But the key word is "conscious." As I pointed out to Phelps, there is a reference to "autonomous agents" in biology that relate to complex adaptive systems, including the "Superorganism" of the insect colony. Here, the autonomous agent is merely a living organism that acts independently but in service of the colony. I have also seen "autonomous agent" used in molecular biology below the level of organism. But, otherwise, we agree.

__________________________________________

HUMAN: But where we profoundly disagree is on this point of what it is we shall assume.

All assumptions are made by *that which does the assuming*, which is itself not an assumption. It is. Science, all of it, to one degree or another is an assumption, in that it must like everything else begin with things taken a priori. The ultimate a priori is the self making the first assumption.

COMMENT: I actually agree, so far. But even if science is an assumption, it is what we have in the third person perspective, and has quite impressive credentials. So, assumptions not withstanding, it should not be dismissed.

________________________________________________

HUMAN: So to your point: no matter how extensive the correlations between the brain and the mind extend, we need never have "any sort of ontological explanation of mind and freewill" to say that mind and freewill exist. The Self stands before *any* explanation of anything, including mind, free will and even itself. The Self stands prior to *any* extensive correlations between anything, including correlations observed between the brain and the mind. If anything *is* the Self is. If it is not, then nothing else is either.

COMMENT: Well, O.K. I respect this argument. But when we are in a scientific and philosophical context we have to have a broader picture, I think. We have to be willing to appreciate the problems with freewill in that context, and address them if we can. Moreover, I think we should look for evidence within the scientific context that supports our intuitions. This attitude may not be important when our personal worldview is concerned, but when we view the extensive correlations from a classical scientific perspective--setting aside the personal perspective--we do see difficulties. Trying to understand consciousness and freewill within these difficulties is interesting and informative to our intuitions, even if we were already quite sure.

____________________________________________________

HUMAN: Science can say nothing without a self saying it. So yes, science can say there is no self and there is no free-will, but a self said that freely enough.

COMMENT: Yes, but materialist science has made heroic efforts to explain the self in neurological terms. Unsuccessfully, in my view, but there are theories as to how the sense of self arises from the brain. But, as I said in my essay, the sense of self is one thing, a conscious, autonomous agent is another. In my view, showing that freewill is true undermines materialist assumptions as to what the self is, and how the sense of self arises.

_____________________________________________

HUMAN: Look, I've made it known over the years that I don't think the good Bishop Berkeley has ever been refuted (which is not the same thing as saying that Dr. Johnson's foot didn't hurt when he kicked a stone, as witty a rejoiner as that may have been). This from the beginning of A Treatise Concerning The Principles Of Human Understanding:

"But besides all that endless variety of Ideas or Objects of Knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers Operations, as Willing, Imagining, Remembering, etc. about them. This perceiving, active Being is what I call Mind, Spirit, Soul or my Self. By which Words I do not denote any one of my Ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they Exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are Perceiv'd, for the Existence of an Idea consists in being Perceiv'd."

COMMENT: Great reminder. Berkeley was a genius, and you are quite right, idealism remains the bug-a-boo of materialist science. Clearly, as you point out, mind must come first, even if we eventually assume there is a material world out there.

_____________________________________________________

HUMAN: In other words, the Self precedes even ideas about itself. The Big Bang, if that is an idea science still believes, does not precede the Self that perceives it.

COMMENT: Yes. Totally agree.

______________________________________________________

HUMAN: So, if Science wants to say there is no mind there is no self there is no free-will there is no soul then it will have to do a hell of lot more than say "Libet etc". Right? In other words, to refute something so a priori fundamental as my Self will require a hell of lot more than the fumblings over the nascent ability to map correlations between my behaviours and the position of my brain's neurons etc at any specific moment. No?

COMMENT: Yes, again, I agree. But I make a distinction between a reasonable worldview based upon our subjective experience, and the third person perspective of science. Should we not engage that perspective? Moreover, isn't empirical science interesting and helpful in informing our intuitions. For me, studying science has solidified my intuitions about mind and freewill.

___________________________________________________

HUMAN: Science is very far away from anything concrete in any of this, very very far away. And as I've said elsewhere, science should stop pretending it is learning anything about "mind" & "consciousness" & "self" & "free-will" and simply go about pursuing *brain studies*. There is still plenty to learn about the brain itself as a thing before it makes any leaps into what are non-existing existing things like "self" etc. --"non-existing existing things" is my clumsy way of indicating the nature of mind etc., but I'm all for the possibility of an "expanded understanding of the physical", as quasi-mormon as that could turn out to be ;^/

COMMENT: Well, this strikes me as a bit impatient, and dismissive of science. I think science is learning something about mind when it does cognitive neuroscience. Moreover, it is not science's fault that the brain is linked to the mind. To ask or expect science not to inquire about mind, and thereby create inevitable third person theories about mind, however, false, is unrealistic. Moreover, as stated, we can be sure of our Self, our freewill, etc. while still engaging science. And I think we will be the better for it.

_____________________________________________________

HUMAN: Okay, I'm rambling and not thinking, as usual. I'm grateful that you countenance my laziness.

COMMENT: Actually, I think you are thinking quite well.

_________________________________________________________

HUMAN: Also, your seeming dismissal of Penrose and Hameroff elsewhere has me re-looking at The Emperor's New Mind.

COMMENT: Well, I am not dismissal of Penrose at all up to the point of his theory; same with Stapp. Both of these writers provide excellent discussion on the nature of human beings, and inadequacy of materialism, with excellent scientific credentials. But, for me, when they get to theory, they fall a bit flat.

Thanks, Human. I have to admit that for a minute, I thought I had lost you. Please accept my apology in advance for any offense created on my part. Creating offense seems to be something I am particularly good at. I hope to some day see you in S.D. And if I ever get above the border, I will look you up.

"Thanks, Human. I have to admit that for a minute, I thought I had lost you. Please accept my apology in advance for any offense created on my part. Creating offense seems to be something I am particularly good at. I hope to some day see you in S.D. And if I ever get above the border, I will look you up."


Lost me? Goodness, no. If I seem less engaged than formerly it is because I'm too busy these days, distracted and etc. I'm reading the board on my phone a lot and hate to type anything long or thoughtful on it. And I'm getting intellectually lazier by the day.

And know that whether I respond or not I read what you write carefully. Will do so later tonight.


(Funny thing about your style, it seems to offend a lot of the same people who insist that style does not signify, that only facts signify.)

Cheers buddy,

Human, as ever

Item 1 of your outline seems to rely upon our sense of free will. Step 1 was mentioned without any reference to your "experimental data." So, it seemed to me you were relying upon our sense of free will. If not, I don't know what item 1 is supposed to be about.

In addition, I don't see how mental causation entails or suggests free-will, as stated in your step 3. The behavior of any mind could itself be determined, for example (and most free-willers think that determinism is antithetical to free-will, whatever "free will" means).

What is so special about the effects of "mental effort" on neural states? We know that mental effort can cause us to raise our hands, or run a mile, or lose 10 lbs. Nobody thinks any of these effects of mental effort "conclusively" demonstrates the existence of mental causes.

The difference between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics is a distinction without a difference. The point is that by positing mental causes you are committing yourself to the view that matter acts one way outside a brain, and another way inside the brain. In other words, you are positing that the current laws of physics, chemistry, and biology fail inside the brain. That's a radical posit. And it has nothing to do with materialism. It has to do with you challenging the current scientific theories. You just shouldn't make such a challenge lightly. And doing so would cause a reasonable person a great deal of pause, whether that person was a materialist or not.

Your definition of "free will" is not one that most free-willers would accept because it does not rule out determinism and because the concept of free will isn't supposed be about whether we make choices or not, it's about whether those choices are freely made. In addition, it may be that your definiton is circular if by "autonomous agent" you simply mean an agent that has free will. So, no I do not believe you successfully defined "free will". In fact, your definition outs you as a philosophical amateur.

Item 1 of your outline seems to rely upon our sense of free will. Step 1 was mentioned without any reference to your "experimental data." So, it seemed to me you were relying upon our sense of free will. If not, I don't know what item 1 is supposed to be about.

COMMENT: Fair point, but the outline was only to try to attract interest in the original post. (Which you obviously have not bothered to read)

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In addition, I don't see how mental causation entails or suggests free-will, as stated in your step 3. The behavior of any mind could itself be determined, for example (and most free-willers think that determinism is antithetical to free-will, whatever "free will" means).

COMMENT: Well, first, mental causation suggests mind in some substantive sense if in fact it has causal properties. Moreover, the nature of the evidence for mental causation is based upon the starting point of mental effort, or engagement in some initial volitional act. Otherwise, I agree that there is nothing in principle that prevents one from accepting mental causation while denying freewill.

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What is so special about the effects of "mental effort" on neural states? We know that mental effort can cause us to raise our hands, or run a mile, or lose 10 lbs. Nobody thinks any of these effects of mental effort "conclusively" demonstrates the existence of mental causes.

COMMENT: But the problem is once you allow "mental effort" you are suggesting an conscious autonomous agent with mental powers. Moreover, as a materialist how do you explain mental effort otherwise? How does that fit in to the materialist assumption of the causal closure of the physical?

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The difference between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics is a distinction without a difference. The point is that by positing mental causes you are committing yourself to the view that matter acts one way outside a brain, and another way inside the brain.

COMMENT: QM has been repeatedly suggested as the basis for neural mechanisms over and above classical neuroscience that might in principle explain mind and freewill. (Reference Henry Stapp and Roger Penrose.)

Also, what are you calling "matter" here. Classically, matter outside the brain acts the same way as matter inside the brain. But the point is that consciousness represents properties that cannot be explained by classical brain matter. There is no classical explanation as to why brain matter should produce subjective experience. So, we have a problem that is brain related, but suggests something else. QM by its standard Bohr-Von Neumann interpretation requires mind (and freewill) (Process 2) to interact with the Schrodinger wave function to collapse the probabilities in order to obtain objective experience. Now, there are other interpretations, but to answer your point, "matter" as classically defined, is inadequate to explain consciousness. However, matter is defined ultimately must account for the mind-brain interactions, whatever it ultimately turns out to be.

________________________________

In other words, you are positing that the current laws of physics, chemistry, and biology fail inside the brain. That's a radical posit. And it has nothing to do with materialism.

COMMENT: Again, NO! The current laws of physics are quantum laws, and they are consistent both inside and outside the brain. However, the brain has properties that outside systems do not have, including a correlation with consciousness. So, the laws of physics might well have a different application in the context of the brain and consciousness than they do with a digital computer, say. Moreover, such laws may well be incomplete. Specifically, QM invokes conscious processes by its standard interpretation. It only makes sense to look to such processes as a possible explanation for consciousness.

______________________________________________________

It has to do with you challenging the current scientific theories. You just shouldn't make such a challenge lightly. And doing so would cause a reasonable person a great deal of pause, whether that person was a materialist or not.

COMMENT: What specific challenges are you claiming to modern physics? There are none. In fact, those scientists who hold my view of materialist science agree. Consciousness, as a causal factor, is a part of modern physics. What shouldn't be taken lightly is the data supporting mental causation and freewill, including the QM data. You cannot just shove it under the rug because it doesn't fit neatly into some theory.

____________________________________________

Your definition of "free will" is not one that most free-willers would accept because it does not rule out determinism and because the concept of free will isn't supposed be about whether we make choices or not, it's about whether those choices are freely made.

COMMENT: Well, philosophically, I think you are right. Most freewillers are compatibilists, not dualists. But in order to have freewill, the notion of real choices between alternatives, with their real alternative causal consequences, must be taken seriously, and that requires a rejection of determinism.

____________________________________

In addition, it may be that your definiton is circular if by "autonomous agent" you simply mean an agent that has free will. So, no I do not believe you successfully defined "free will". In fact, your definition outs you as a philosophical amateur.

COMMENT: Don't be stupid. You are absolutely wrong. There are "autonomous agents" in biology that relate to complex unconscious systems, where the words "autonomous" and "agent" have meaning outside of human consciousness. By combining the two, I was only pointing out that freewill implies more that just autonomous agency in this limited sense.

So, you see, I am afraid that it is you that outed yourself as an amateur on these issues.

I did read your lengthy post, but it was a week or so ago. Didn't find it convincing then, either.

I still don't know why you think the alleged effects of mental effort on neural states has any kind of special status in this debate. Mental effort can clearly result in lots of bodily changes. Why are the changes in neural states special? Why do those changes provide evidence for mental causes?

But now you confuse me. First it seemed like you were saying that there were special kinds of causes, namely mental causes, that were different from physical causes. But now it seems that you are saying that quantum mechanics might be the source of mental causes. But if quantum mechanics is the source of mental causes, then mental causes aren't really special at all. In this case mental causes would just be the effects of quantum mechanical laws.

In addition, on the one hand you appear to deny that you are challenging current scientific laws, but on the other hand you say that scientific laws might be incomplete. So, are you challenging current scientific laws or not?

In addition, you still haven't provided an acceptable definition of "free will."

I was tempted to post, "I'm waiting!" as exclaimed by Vizzini (The Princess Bride" movie) but I absolutely know my tone would be misunderstood by someone.

So, suffice it to say that I await this discussion, knowing that I have the intellect to follow but do not have the training or experience to participate authoritatively. So I'll watch in the wings for now.

I am just glad this has started as a respectful debate and my hope is that it will not devolve into the (seemingly) usual battle of egos. I certainly do not expect Tal and Henry to succumb. But, as in any group, there are those...

To you who "should" know who you are, please refrain.

I think most people here are more interested in opening the horse's mouth and counting teeth, riding the horse, or kicking out the teeth with their knee-jerk reactions. But as an informal proof it's compelling. It reads like a western rediscovery of yin and yang.

Keeping the paranormal out of the discussion is a good idea. It's like avoiding talk of oceans, rivers, snow and ice when all you want to say is that water must be wet.

These kinds of dry discussions are necessary if a real science of the soul is to emerge. After all, there's all this physical evidence but no scientific foundation for it. If you let religion provide a squishy made-up foundation, there's nothing on which to build. It won't hold the weight of new construction.

The old approach of ignoring the evidence isn't working so well anymore. Just ask the Mormons. Science is slowly building a foundation for beingness. So what? Beingness on a rock solid foundation changes everything because it can be built sky high. That's what.

I now have a much better understanding of what it means "to be" than when I was in Mormonism. But maybe that's just from spending more time in inner space. Once duality is established, you might ask "Why?". Why the whole good/evil thing, body/soul, inside/outside duality so central to our existence? A test of obedience? No. Please STFU no. It has absolutely nothing to do with obedience. It's about self co-creation.

Consider the "Drawing Hands" lithograph:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drawing_Hands#/media/File:DrawingHands.jpg

This shows two hands drawing each other. This is how creativity works. The lithograph as a whole is the soul. The material world is one hand, the spirit world is the other. You are the one doing the drawing. Life is a continuous process of creation. Take for example the immune response of your body to foreign invaders. That's creative problem solving. Or you dealing with life in general. Creativity. This co-creation goes back the chain of evolution to the first microbes 3.8 billion years ago, and much further still in the creation of the precursors of life drifting around interstellar space like so many spores.

The world seems like an insane place. The duality, so much pain, so much evil. But it's not madness. It's perfection.

Just been busy - I'll get to this as soon as I can...

Henry - You wrote:

"I see no way of answering this question without dualism of some sort, even if the mind turns out to be some sort of expanded understanding of the "physical."

??

Isn't that simply to reduce the meaning of the word "dualism" to "monism"? And isn't that in turn simply to argue for something like panpsychism? And if it is, on what grounds could you deny "mind" to anything - including, say, individual neurons (or atoms, for that matter)?



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 03/20/2015 05:31PM by Tal Bachman.

TB: "Isn't that simply to reduce the meaning of the word "dualism" to "monism"? And isn't that in turn simply to argue for something like panpsychism? And if it is, on what grounds could you deny "mind" to anything - including, say, individual neurons (or atoms, for that matter)?"

COMMENT:

Well, this depends on what you mean by physical, which is why in my cited quote the word "physical" is in quotations. So, let's distinguish between "physical" in the Newtonian classical sense; "physical" in the relativity sense; physical in the quantum sense, and "physical" as might be appropriately expanded to encompass "substance dualism" as classically defined by those interpreting Descartes, and those commenting on him to the present day. (What follows is admittedly sketchy, off the top of my head, but I think you will get the point.)

Physical in the Newtonian sense is simply matter, which would include the basic building blocks of atoms and molecules. It would essentially include everything that had mass. Physical in the context of relativity would include matter and energy pursuant to Einstein's E=MC(2). But what about spacetime? Physical? When we get to QM and subatomic particles and fields, "physical" starts to become more ambiguous. Now, massless particles, like photons, gluons, etc., and other particles which we know only by inference, or even mathematical assumption, must be considered "physical." What about quantum particles without definitive spatial location and momentum at all, that exist as mathematical probabilities. In short, it seems to me that the word "physical" in modern science, to the extent it is used at all, simply means the postulated "entities" of modern science, whatever they are.

So, if one is a "substance dualist" in the tradition of Descartes, they have to deal with what mind is; i.e. the ontological question. Is this question beyond science in principle, such that it is "supernatural" or simply beyond science as it currently is understood. I believe that everything has an explanation in principle; i.e. that all of reality is ultimately tied to the operation of laws, and that mind and "matter" is explainable as coexisting in a single system. So, in that sense, you might say I am both a dualist and a physicalist (broadly speaking). However, since that system must accommodate mind in some way, which we currently have no understanding of within the context of modern science, it would seem that any ultimate explanation will most likely will involve natural laws, and entities, that we are not yet familiar. But, I don't know.

This is not panpsychism. Panpsychism is already committed to a metaphysical view; namely that mind exists in everything. Maybe that will turn out to be true in some sense, but maybe not. And I see no reason or evidence to adopt such a view. As I have said many, many times, consciousness, mental causation, and freewill (if they exist) represent data to be explained. They are not theories. What theory ultimately explains them, including what "entities" and forces that are involved in such an explanation, remains to be seen. But, that said, if someone becomes committed to a speculative theory, there should at least be some evidence to support it, besides just the need for a theory.

"And I see no reason or evidence to adopt such a view."

That's the problem with evidence. It's too sparse. The reality of rogue waves, the kind that come out of nowhere on a calm sea to capsize boats, was widely rejected until technology made the evidence unavoidable.

There are many apocryphal stories of "miracles". I'll just mention two.

1. An impoverished ward in Tahiti undertakes to build a chapel. As is the tradition there, they build the roof first. The roof requires a long, custom beam. They have the roof built and the beam arrives but it's 6" too short. They can't afford another beam. The ward is very upset but they agree to go home and pray for it to be made right. The next day, they check the fit again. It fits perfectly. This was a firsthand account from a TBM super prudish bishop.

2. A thunder storm knocks out power in a neighborhood. DW and son pray for the power to come back on and it does, after 2 hours. The next day, they find that all of the neighbors had experienced a power outage of 6 hours. All of the houses are powered from the same transformer. One of the neighbors remarks that she saw that they were running a generator because the lights were on. But the generator was definitely out of commission (broke it myself) and not within DW's capability to rig up anyway.

It's possible to chalk these up to delusions or flights of fancy. OTOH, the witnesses are very credible. Since DW had displayed PSI phenomena for 20 years (to the point of undeniable proof), it's not really a leap for me to believe DW's account. The materialist view requires standing on one's head. If you stand on two feet, the world is easier to make sense of. Taking the latter approach, these two examples (out of many) are considered natural phenomena. Not miracles, not woo, just plain old physics.

The mind alters matter. How the f--k can it do that? We don't know, but the fact that it can means a lot. What is mind? What is matter? Maybe we're babes in the woods on both of these questions. But babes can ask questions and postulate that the underlying reality is all mind. This is a popular meme these days.

I like to take it a step further: Maybe the underlying reality is all heart. But then, that's too simple. Heart and mind playing together create reality. If you screw around with either the heart or the mind, as a certain religion does, you mess up reality.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 03/21/2015 02:07PM by bradley.

>> The mind alters matter. How the f--k can it do that? We don't know, but the fact that it can means a lot. What is mind? What is matter? <<

Some think the reason matter can be altered is because the matter isn’t really even there; that reality is just a dream you’re having in your mind; a hallucination of sorts. Think of how concrete and ‘real’ a dream can be. Maybe reality and matter are just a figment of your imagination (whatever ‘you’ are). Under those conditions, anything is possible.

Under those conditions, reality would be whatever you convince yourself it is. (Danger!)

Just a thought for you bradley.

But then that leads to the next thought … why? Why have this experience?

How is "the existence of free will" a datum (as opposed to a question)? The Libet theories have been replicated now several times, and on the other hand, that I know of, there is no empirical evidence which contradicts those findings.

In your words, it's not "a datum," not even close. And it seems bizarre to take it as one.

It is true that Libet's results appear ambiguous regarding free-will. Nevertheless, it is more significant that the concept of free-will itself appears to be incoherent. I challenge anyone to provide an acceptable, coherent definition of "free-will." I don't think anyone can. I tend to agree with the sentiment stated in

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

given below (where by "free-will" above I mean something like Smilansky's ultimate free-will, since something like that is what most people have in mind when they refer to "free-will"):

"A recent trend is to suppose that agent causation accounts capture, as well as possible, our prereflective idea of responsible, free action. But the failure of philosophers to work the account [of "free-will"] out in a fully satisfactory and intelligible form reveals that the very idea of free will (and so of responsibility) is incoherent (Strawson 1986) or at least inconsistent with a world very much like our own (Pereboom 2001). Smilansky (2000) takes a more complicated position, on which there are two ‘levels’ on which we may assess freedom, ‘compatibilist’ and ‘ultimate’. On the ultimate level of evaluation, free will is indeed incoherent. (Strawson, Pereboom, and Smilansky all provide concise defenses of their positions in Kane 2002.)"

If the concept of "free-will" is incoherent to begin with, we really need not pay too much attention to any science.

"It is true that Libet's results appear ambiguous regarding free-will."

COMMENT: This comment suggests that freewill is a real, genuine issue. As such, the concept of freewill cannot also be "incoherent."

_______________________________________

"Nevertheless, it is more significant that the concept of free-will itself appears to be incoherent. I challenge anyone to provide an acceptable, coherent definition of "free-will." I don't think anyone can."

COMMENT: This is utter nonsense. You keep saying this, even after I gave you a definition, and many others have stated a similar definition of freewill, including Libet. Where lies the "incoherency" unless you insist that the concept of freewill must be compatible with the concept of determinism. Upon that assumption, I agree freewill is incoherent. But to take that assumption as a given is to beg the question, not to mention being incompatible with modern science.

Genuine freewill may be true or false, but it is most assuredly NOT incoherent, which explains why there is so much literature on the subject. Philosophers and scientists are not debating nonsense! The concept is well understood, whether it is right or wrong.

And stop citing false authority. I have read Strawson, Pereboom, and Smilansky, as well as the complete Kane 2002. (Kane (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 638 pages, which I just pulled form my own bookself) These authors (not Kane) are all hard determinists and present the view that freewill is an illusion. You might want to read (and cite) the many articles in this book that address opposing views, as I have!)

False authority? Are you saying that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a false authority? Are you saying that Kane et al are false authority, even though you seem proud of having Kane's text on your bookshelf? And just because some of the cited thinkers have concluded, rightly in my view, that the concept of "free-will" is hopelessly confused, does not make those persons false authority.

People label all kinds of incoherent notions and then proceed to employ those labels in conversation. Said use of labels does not imply that the underlying notions are coherent.

Your definition of "free-will" is that "Freewill exists if there is an autonomous agent, such that said agent can make choices between alternative actions, and the acts of such agent have causal efficacy." This definition appears to fail to even attempt to capture the notion of freedom that is supposed to be a hallmark of "free-will." Your definition only references the ability to make choices. It does not require those choices to be freely made. Similarly, this definition is compatible with determinism, which you seem to think is incompatible with free-will. Even a determined agent can make choices. Those choices will be determined, but they will be choices, nevertheless. Thus, yours is just not a successful definition.

TB: "How is "the existence of free will" a datum (as opposed to a question)?

COMMENT: This quote represents my view that the existence of freewill is a fact sufficiently established by relevant empirical evidence. Of course, others disagree. But, if it is not established, the evidence for it; i.e. the empirical data that infers, or seems to infer, the existence of free will, must be explained. Of course, this is also true for any empirical data that seems to undermine freewill, like the Libet experiments.

TB: "The Libet theories have been replicated now several times, and on the other hand, that I know of, there is no empirical evidence which contradicts those findings."

COMMENT: First, there is no such thing as "the Libet theories." Libet's experiments represent data to be explained as noted above. Second, your suggestion that there is no empirical evidence which contradicts such experiments, implies an interpretation of this data that denies freewill, which Libet himself rejects. The Libet experiments are, and have been, subject to different interpretations, as well as differences of opinion as to their implication for freewill. Only hard-core determinists rally around this data as conclusive; which it clearly is not.

Now, I could give you my own views about the experiments and what they mean for freewill, and will gladly do so, if you will first provide a summary of the experiments for readers not familiar with these experiments and might be interested in following the discussion. I am no longer inclined to provide detailed summaries of issues that are casually raised by others in a sentence or two, before I substantively address those issues. So, provide a reasonably thorough summary of the Libet experiments, and I will provide my specific views.

In the meantime, here are a few quotes from Libet about freewill, least someone think I am dodging your question:

"What we have achieved experimentally is some knowledge of how free will may operate. But we have not answered the question of whether our consciously willed acts are fully determined by natural laws that govern the activities of nerve cells in the brain, or whether acts and the conscious decisions to perform them can proceed to some degree independently of natural determinism."

"[T]here has been no evidence, or even a proposed experimental test design, that definitively or convincingly demonstrates that validity of natural law determinism as the mediator or instrument of free will."

"The assumption that a deterministic nature of the physical observable world (to the extent that may be true) can account for subjective conscious functions and events is a speculative belief, not a scientifically proven proposition."

"My conclusion about free will, one genuinely free in the non-determined sense, is then that its existence is at least as good, if not a better, scientific option than is its denial by determinist theory."

Libet further commented (remembering Human's criticism in this thread):

"[W]e must recognize that the almost universal experience that we can act with a free, independent choice provides a kind of prima facie evidence that conscious mental processes can causatively control some brain processes. . .

"The intuitive feelings about the phenomenon of free will form a fundamental basis for views of our human nature, and great care should be taken not to believe allegedly scientific conclusions about them which actually depend upon hidden ad hoc assumptions. A theory that simply interprets the phenomenon of free will as illusory and denies the validity of this phenomenal fact is less attractive than a theory that accepts or accommodates the phenomenal fact."

(All quotes from Libet, B, "Do We Have Free Will? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6 No. 8-9, 1999, pp. 47-57)

So, Tal, your assumptions about the Libet experiments, i.e. that they are somehow conclusive and fatal to freewill, appear to be based not upon Libet's views of these experiments, or the experiments themselves, but the views of determinist skeptics of free will. Again, review the actual Libet essays (for example, the one cited above), provide a summary of these experiments, and I will then gladly provide substantive comment about them.

Finally, I am a bit edgy this morning, for which I apologize. I am not feeling well and to be honest feel a bit alienated and discouraged about the Board right now. These are undoubtedly related. Notwithstanding, I have appreciated our dialogue recently, and as I said, will look forward to a more thorough discussion of Libet if you choose to pursue it. Other than that, I think I need a break.

HB

The problem with "free-will" is that the concept of "free-will" has not been made coherent.

Thus, any claims that empirical evidence supports the actualization of the concept are naturally suspect.

Henry - I meant the Libet "tests" (not "theories")

Henry - Your tone is relentlessly pontifical. This is peculiar, especially when we are discussing topics hotly debated within the scientific community.

Moreover, you seem to think that anyone with a question about your ex cathedra pronouncements has "not read the literature". In fact, many of us have read about these sorts of things, and are simply wondering about them; and we don't know of any obligation to take your pronouncements as definitive, not least because some of your comments undermine other comments of yours.

It is also odd that you should require that I describe the Libet experiments in detail for those just joining the discussion as a precondition of your future involvement in what the rest of us thought was a fairly friendly chat. One hundred percent of all our readers are familiar with Google and Wikipedia, and could familiarize themselves with these famous experiments in just a few minutes. Why you should presume to require that I provide my own description here is mysterious.

Lastly, it is perfectly true that Libet refused to rule out the possibility of free will based on the results of his experiments. The problem is that him refusing to rule free will out really doesn't mean anything - the results of his experiments, which have now been replicated several times, seem utterly incompatible with the notion that some sort of autonomous conscious will within us is deciding everything. Whatever Libet himself says - about vetoes or anything else - doesn't change those test results.

In short, the replicable Libet test results undermine your claims about free will.

This is not to say I do not believe in free will. I don't know what the truth is. It is only to say that your earlier essays triumphantly announcing the birth of the soul and the fact of free will seem to rely on not adequately reckoning with Libet's sobering results.



Edited 2 time(s). Last edit at 03/21/2015 08:21PM by Tal Bachman.

Tal Bachman Wrote

> Lastly, it is perfectly true that Libet refused to
> rule out the possibility of free will based on the
> results of his experiments. The problem is that
> him refusing to rule free will out really doesn't
> mean anything - the results of his experiments,
> which have now been replicated several times, seem
> utterly incompatible with the notion that some
> sort of autonomous conscious will within us is
> deciding everything. Whatever Libet himself says -
> about vetoes or anything else - doesn't change
> those test results.
>
> In short, the replicable Libet test results
> undermine your claims about free will.


Tal, you could do me an enormous favour if you wish, and I hope you wish it, at the least to further the discussion you have set forth.

1. Does Mele misrepresent The Libbet experiments in the following clip?


2. If not, are Mele's criticisms invalid?

http://youtu.be/wI3cXbIlA0g

Thank you in advance.

Human

"Henry - Your tone is relentlessly pontifical. This is peculiar, especially when we are discussing topics hotly debated within the scientific community."

COMMENT: I admit that my tone is often offensive, and I am really sorry for that. I just get caught up in my views and the discussion. Moreover, I constantly see comments "in the scientific literature" that are obviously and objectively shortsighted. Moreover, if my views are wrong, give me an argument. I always address arguments. If you want to argue Libet, state what the debate is about; explain the tests you are defending. Is that so unreasonable?

____________________________________________

Moreover, you seem to think that anyone with a question about your ex cathedra pronouncements has "not read the literature". In fact, many of us have read about these sorts of things, and are simply wondering about them; and we don't know of any obligation to take your pronouncements as definitive answers, not least because some of your comments undermine other comments of yours.

COMMENT: When I say or imply that someone has not read the literature it is because a comment has indicated that to me. Of course, I may be wrong. Keep in mind I am accused of that too. So, I agree that it is a rhetorical device that is probably best avoided. If my comments are inconsistent, or seem so, call me on it, and I will explain, or admit if I have misspoke.

____________________________________________

It is also odd that you should require that I describe the Libet experiments in detail for those just joining the discussion as a precondition of your future involvement in what the rest of us thought was a fairly friendly chat.

COMMENT: All I asked was a reasonably detailed summary. I could provide that off the top of my head in one or two paragraphs, but since you introduced this line of argument, it seems reasonable for you to provide the background information that you are referring to.

____________________________________

One hundred percent of all our readers are familiar with Google and Wikipedia, and could familiarize themselves with these famous experiments in just a few minutes. Why you should presume to require that I provide my own description here is mysterious.

COMMENT: Because for someone familiar with these experiments it is easy to do, and it helps to be clear just what we are talking about on the Board. These experiments are controversial in both substance and interpretation. Let's put them out on the open. I am sure there are readers who would appreciate that.

You say you are willing to address arguments and inconsistencies, but I still wait for you to address the following issues raised above:

"I still don't know why you think the alleged effects of mental effort on neural states has any kind of special status in this debate. Mental effort can clearly result in lots of bodily changes. Why are the changes in neural states special? Why do those changes provide evidence for mental causes?

But now you confuse me. First it seemed like you were saying that there were special kinds of causes, namely mental causes, that were different from physical causes. But now it seems that you are saying that quantum mechanics might be the source of mental causes. But if quantum mechanics is the source of mental causes, then mental causes aren't really special at all. In this case mental causes would just be the effects of quantum mechanical laws.

In addition, on the one hand you appear to deny that you are challenging current scientific laws, but on the other hand you say that scientific laws might be incomplete. So, are you challenging current scientific laws or not?"

And

"Your definition of "free-will" is that "Freewill exists if there is an autonomous agent, such that said agent can make choices between alternative actions, and the acts of such agent have causal efficacy." This definition appears to fail to even attempt to capture the notion of freedom that is supposed to be a hallmark of "free-will." Your definition only references the ability to make choices. It does not require those choices to be freely made. Similarly, this definition is compatible with determinism, which you seem to think is incompatible with free-will. Even a determined agent can make choices. Those choices will be determined, but they will be choices, nevertheless. Thus, yours is just not a successful definition."